Die Begriffe Geist und Leben bei Paulus in ihren Beziehungen zu einander

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After all that has been written on the Pauline pneumatology of late, it still remains true that an inquiry into the relations between the Spirit and life in Paul’s teaching is by no means a work of supererogation. Considerable unclearness and difference of opinion still exist among students of Paulinism on this fundamental subject. The author conducts his investigation in five steps: first, he discusses the conception of life; next the relation of the Spirit to life; thirdly, the method according to which the Spirit operates in this relation; fourthly, the anthropological presuppositions; and finally, the source of the Pauline conceptions. The inquiry is based on the four great Epistles, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philippians, Colossians and Philemon. Through a curious oversight in the preface, where these are enumerated, Philippians is not mentioned. A large part of the book, especially in the earlier chapters, is exegetical in its character, and these exegetical discussions constitute, in our view, its chief merit, being marked throughout by great penetration and lucidity. In the first part the eschatological aspect of Paul’s conception of life and its aspect as a present life are separately dealt with, and then the unity in principle of these two aspects is shown. Valuable, in view of the extreme physical eschatologicism of Kabisch and others, is the demonstration that Paul knows of a life consisting in moral and religious processes. When the two sides of this present life are distinguished as ethical righteousness and justification (the status of sonship), this, while substantially correct, is liable to create a misconception, as if life were identical with the act of justification—a misconception which the author more or less invites by saying that “the imputed righteousness is an element of the present life.” It would be better to say that the state of sonship, insofar as it involves communion with God, forms to Paul the religious aspect of life, and that justification lies at the basis of this sonship-life. The inseparable connection between the forensic righteousness and the ethical renewal is admirably brought out, and the logical precedence of the former carefully guarded. We are not so sure that we can follow the author where he thinks to have discovered the principle of this inseparable connection in the Pauline idea of faith. According to him, faith as an affirmation and appropriation of the meaning of Christ’s death, both as a passive experience and as an act of obedience, necessarily produces in this its twofold character, a twofold effect in the relation of the believer toward sin: on the one hand, the removal of the guilt of sin; on the other hand, the determination to put away sin in practice. We do not mean to dispute that faith, according to Paul, actually performs both functions; but it is a totally different thing to affirm that, as performing both, it furnishes the ultimate explanation of the vital nexus of the two sides of the effect of the death of Christ, the forensic and the ethical. Faith in reference to justification is so much the opposite of every positive, active attitude, so much the negative of works, that it becomes exceedingly difficult to explain its unity with faith in reference to the ethical sphere as a principle of sanctification. The two appear to have no more in common than the general form of faith. All that we can say is that, according to Paul, they coexist and are inseparably connected, and both have to do with the death of Christ. What the author takes to be an explanation of the twofoldness of Paul’s soteriology appears to us to be simply one of the phenomena in what this twofoldness reveals itself. In this twofold significance of faith we have the subjective reflex of the twofold strain which runs through the apostle’s interpretation of the death of Christ everywhere. In our opinion the true reason why justification entails sanctification must not be sought on the subjective side, in faith, but on the objective side, in the modus operandi of the atonement. Because Paul views the ethical bondage of man
under sin as a result of his condemnation by the law, therefore the removal of this condemnation, the canceling of the guilt, *ipsa facto*, also sets him ethically free; more strictly speaking, enables God forensically to free him in the ethical sphere. That this is subjectively mediated or applied by faith, so far as the conscious life of man is concerned, remains more or less true, and we are just as much indebted to the author for having so convincingly shown this. Another point in regard to which we are not quite prepared to accept the author’s conclusions is the exegesis of such passages as 2 Cor. 3:18; 4:10, 11; 13:4, when he makes these prove that Paul assumed a life-giving influence of the Spirit upon the body of believers in this present life.

In the second part, dealing with the relations between the Spirit and life, the former is shown to be the author and the guarantee of the latter. We here find an illuminating exegesis of such difficult passages as Rom. 1:3, 4; 8:1-4. The most interesting section, however, here is that on the relation between justification and the Spirit. Against Weiss and Pfleiderer, and many others, the thesis is upheld that justifying faith is a product and gift of the Spirit, not an act of the natural man, as Schmiedel would have it, nor an operation of God in a general sense merely (apart from the Spirit), as Gunkel believes. 2 Cor. 4:13, 3:3; Rom. 7:3; Phil. 1:29; 1 Cor. 2:5; indirectly also Gal. 4:23, 28, are quoted as decisive indications of the true Pauline position in this question. Equally instructive are the remarks on p. 77 on the twofold aspect of the apostle’s conception of freedom, the ethical and the religious.

The third part, in which the word and baptism are found to be the media in connection with which the Spirit operates in the first production of life, calls for little comment. We doubt whether the statement that the Spirit within the Christian state is as entirely independent of outward means in working life as he is in his charismatic operations is capable of proof. 2 Cor. 3:18, where, according to the author’s own exegesis, “the mirror” is the Gospel, would seem to disprove this. In vain the author seeks to interpret the passage 1 Cor. 10:3-4 in such a way as to exclude the implication that in the Lord’s Supper the Spirit operates as well as in baptism. Granted that *pneumatikos*, joined to meat, drink, rock, does not mean “pneuma-conveying,” but simply “of heavenly origin,” the former is surely given with the latter. When something of heavenly origin becomes a meat and a drink, this can have no other purpose and effect than to communicate the peculiar power with which in virtue of its heavenly origin it is endued. And if the Spirit in the Lord’s Supper acts upon the life of believers, this is a direct proof that within the Christian state as well as at its beginning the Spirit operates mediately.

In part four, under the head of the anthropological suppositions, the author seeks to determine how Paul conceives of the Spirit in his relation to the elements of man’s natural being. *Σαρξ*, *νοῦς*, *συνείδησις*, *καρδία*, *πνεῦμα*, *ἐσω ἀνθρώπος* are successively discussed. The main conclusion drawn from this discussion is that the Spirit of God possesses objective reality outside of the subjectivity of man, that he operates as such upon the inner man and causes the latter to react upon his influence, so that from the cooperation of these two elements those new activities result which are called life. The new product is not the Spirit of God itself, which in that case would come to supply the place of a deficiency in natural man. Nor does Paul so subjectivize the Spirit as to identify him with man’s own spiritual disposition. The author vigorously disputes the widely spread opinion that *πνεῦμα* frequently means with Paul the new, specifically Christian subject. His position in this respect is, in our opinion, bound to find general acceptance in the end. Between the anthropological *πνεῦμα*,

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as a part of man’s nature, and the objective divine πνεῦμα, there is neither place nor necessity for any other. Everything Paul predicates of the πνεῦμα anywhere can, we believe, without difficulty be distributed between these two. By far the most space in this section is occupied by the discussion of the Pauline notion of σαρξ. On the one hand the author points out that the σαρξ as the material element in man is not sinful in itself. On the other hand he shows that in its ethical and religious contrast with the πνεῦμα it assumes positively sinful character. By insisting upon it that in the latter connection also it retains its concrete, physical meaning of the substance of the body he involves the apostle in a contradiction, in order to explain which he later on has to resort to the theory that these two divergent views arose from the conflict of Judaism and Hellenism in the mind of Paul. We are willing to acknowledge that the notion of σαρξ in its ethical significance involves a problem which no one so far has been able satisfactorily to solve. The difficulty lies in this, that in some of the apostle’s statements the sinful character of the σαρξ is distinctly brought into connection with its bodily associations. But it should be clearly recognized and as freely acknowledged that the characterization of the σαρξ as sinful is by no means coextensive in Paul with such statements. It covers a wider range. There are instances in which the σαρξ is ethically and religiously condemned and yet the body cannot be thought of. Purely spiritual sins are attributed to it. This the author has neglected to take into account. So far as it is the case the Hellenistic theory fails to explain the facts.

The last section of the book, in which the sources of the various views and conceptions discussed are traced, is not the least instructive and interesting part of the whole. From the nature of the case there is here more room for dissent than when the author moves on purely inductive exegetical ground. We may mark the following as his main conclusions: Paul is original, in comparison with primitive Palestinian Christianity, in ascribing to the Spirit operations in the ethical and religious sphere. He is not original, however, in this respect as compared with the Old Testament and Judaism, for here the Spirit is distinctly conceived of as the source of ethical and religious dispositions, although he is not represented as the author of life in doing this, nor even as the author of the physical resurrection-life. With the latter position we can heartily agree, and believe the author has done a good work in emphasizing this point over against recent denials (Gunkel, Pfleiderer, and others). Only a more careful distinction might have been drawn between the operation of the Spirit in ethically and religiously qualifying the office-bearers of the theocracy and his operation in working obedience to the law in general. More hesitant we feel ourselves as to following the conclusions reached in regard to the apostle’s relations to Jesus and primitive Christianity on this point. The author himself acknowledges that they are in a certain sense provisional insofar as they are based on mere silence, and “it is a difficult, perhaps hopeless, undertaking to seek to obtain a reliable picture of Palestinian-Ur-Christian relations and conceptions from the scant statements of the Synoptists and Acts.” In the teaching of Jesus certainly the two principles from whose combination a doctrine of the life-giving work of the Spirit in the moral sphere would almost inevitably spring were given, viz., strong emphasis on the ethical and great prominence of the Spirit as the chief gift of the Messianic age. And the author here simply discounts the important testimony of the Fourth Gospel, no doubt because he is convinced of its unhistorical character.

From the source of Hellenism are derived: the conception of σαρξ as an inherently sinful principle, above referred to; the conceptions of νους and συνείδησις and the modification of the Jewish conceptions of καρδία and πνεῦμα as belonging to the ἐσω ἀνθρώπος, in analogy with νους and συνείδησις, side by side with which modification they, however, retain their original Old Testament
meaning; the development of the material conception of the πνεῦμα into that of a local sphere or element inside of which certain processes take place; the idea of a gradual development in the life of the body already in the present state; finally, the expectation of a perfect, embodied life with God immediately after death, to which Paul is believed to give expression in 2 Cor. 5 and Phil. 1. In connection with the last-mentioned point we miss what forms the most conspicuous merit of the earlier part of the book, viz., a painstaking exegetical ascertainment of the facts. Especially the passage in 2 Cor. 5 is so difficult, and subject to such widely divergent interpretations, that any conclusions based on an exegesis of it which is simply taken for granted and not justified in detail, must for that reason alone lack all force. We believe Titius has clearly shown that the ἐπενδύσασθαι of which Paul here speaks excludes the ἐκδύσασθαι; where the one takes place the other does not; the former, therefore, cannot be referred to the moment of death, but must have reference to the moment of the Parousia. The author does not hesitate to represent Paul as involving himself by this new phase of his doctrine of the future life in an open contradiction. He repudiates all the feeble attempts at explanation or reconciliation that have been proposed. Paul did not cherish this Hellenic hope as something applying to himself alone by way of exception, and, on the other hand, he did not, in formulating it, mean to give up the older Jewish view of a resurrection at the end, to whose continued existence several passages later than 2 Cor. 5 bear the clearest witness.

Alongside of the Jewish and Hellenic elements other elements are recognized as original in the sense that they were derived from Paul’s personal experience. To this category belong the following ideas: first of all, the thought that the Spirit is the source of a present (ethical and religious) life. In the next place, the conception of the human πνεῦμα as an organ which mediates between the Spirit of God and the human individual. Further, the manner in which Paul has modified the dualistic contrast between flesh and spirit. Not the material nature of his σάρξ makes man sinful in the last analysis, but personal self-determination against God. The profound ethicism of Paul’s Jewish past alone does not, in the author’s opinion, sufficiently explain this, because he goes so far as to place a positive ethical and religious valuation on the σῶμα. Paul’s deepened moral consciousness, it is believed, furnishes the only satisfactory explanation of his peculiar mixed anthropology, and this deepened moral consciousness itself can only in part be traced back to contact with primitive Christianity and the teaching of Jesus. And to the expression of this very personal element in the apostle’s consciousness even the adoption of the Hellenic idea of the σαρξ had to become subservient, for in the last analysis this also tends not to depreciate human responsibility, but simply to bring out the terrible proportions of man’s natural corruption and the absolute indispensableness of redemption. Still further the author derives from Paul’s personal experience at his conversion the close identification between Christ and the Spirit. The effect of the appearance of the exalted Christ upon Paul had been preeminently an effect of power, which as such had to be interpreted in terms of the Spirit. Here the author follows closely in the footsteps of Gunkel. It is worth while to take note of this, in view of the recent attempt of Brückner to derive the pneumatic character of the Pauline Christ from the apostle’s erstwhile Jewish Christological belief. Interesting is the thought developed on p. 234, that Paul’s conception of the Spirit as working in contact with the word, viz.,, in its first creative stage, is in strict analogy with the apostle’s experience at his own conversion, where not only a seeing but likewise a hearing had taken place.

We take leave of the book with the grateful acknowledgment that in many points, even in such with reference to which we found it necessary to take issue with the author’s conclusions, it has enlarged
and clarified our knowledge of a most fundamental portion of the great apostle’s teaching.